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Dialectical Method:  
Henri Lefebvre's Philosophy 
of Science 
William S. Lewis examines the contribution to philosophy of science 
made by Lefebvre, in the context of his membership of the French 
Communist Party.  
 
The Marxist philosopher and social scientist Henri Lefebvre (1901-1991) authored 
over 60 books. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that some of these are less well-known 
than his Critique of Everyday Life (1947), Introduction to Modernity, (1962), 
or Dialectical Materialism (1940), each of which continues to inform the work of 
architects, geographers, sociologists, and philosophers. Active as an author for over 
seventy years, Lefebvre’s oeuvre begins with contributions to the surrealist 
movement, proceeds with an important translation of Hegel and Marx, and then 
ranges across metaphysics, rural and urban sociology, critiques of fascism, memoirs, 
poetry, and literary criticism. 
Given the breadth of his interests and the relative obscurity of some of his writings, it 
is little wonder that few readers have examined Lefebvre’s contribution to philosophy 
of science. This is especially understandable given that his major work in this area, 
des Sciences remained unpublished for more than fifty years and only saw the light of 
day in 2002.[1] It remains untranslated into English. des Science, was written by 
Lefebvre under the auspices of the French Communist Party and–at that 
organization’s behest–it attempted to integrate the “insights” of Stalin’s Short 
Course into Marxian philosophy. Given this mission, one aspect of the work that 
remains of particular interest to those interested in how ideology affects understanding 
is the way in which Lefebvre maintains fidelity to Stalin’s seconding of Marx and 
Engels’ insight that a subject’s social and economic position determines her 
worldview while simultaneously defending the objectivity of scientific knowledge 
Fidelity to these seemingly contradictory epistemological positions sets up an 
interesting tension. For, insofar as scientists are methodologically rigorous, Lefebvre 
argues that they tend to produce true or correct knowledge about the world. However, 
Lefebvre also argued that ideology allows, motivates, directs, and controls scientific 
research and, further, that ideology informs the public reception of its results. 
In negotiating this contradiction, Lefebvre’s work does not resemble the then-
dominant position in philosophy of science: logical positivism or logical empiricism, 
which had it that the problem of subjectivity could be overcome by sufficient 
methodological rigor and logical analysis. Instead, he prefigures contemporary ideas 
about scientific practice and knowledge that have been voiced by feminist 
philosophers of science and social epistemologists over the last three decades. In so 
doing, his work anticipates standpoint theory, contextual empiricism, as well as 
methodological pluralism.[2] 
Lefebvre finished Méthodologie des Sciences in 1947, at the exact time when the 
French Communist Party was moving from its endorsement of the “Thesis of the 
Unity of International Sciences” to that of the “Two Sciences.”[3] As part of a larger 
theoretical and political distinction which divided the world into two antagonistic 
camps, this dichotomy was deployed at the beginning of the Cold War in order to 
differentiate Soviet from Western Science and to prove the superiority of the former. 
With dogmatic assertion and propaganda directing research and research supporting 
propaganda and dogmatic assertion, communist scientists and party ideologues 
contended that ‘bourgeois science’ was unable to provide knowledge of the world as it 
really is because its method is based on the mistaken, positivist assumption that 
natural laws are discovered through empirical inquiry into objective facts. 
By way of contrast, it was posited that proletarian science is able to discern dialectical 
processes at work in nature and to know the world truly. Why? Because it recognizes–
at its heart–the dialectical relationship between theory and practice. 
From the late 1940s until the mid-1950s, this theoretical distinction between the two 
types of scientific practice resulted in the denial of the veracity of conclusions reached 
by European and North American scientists and to the falsification or gross 
misinterpretation of empirical data obtained by Soviet scientists in their own 
research.[4] The distinction sometimes led to the Soviet Union’s rejection of practical 
technological advancements which were based upon the conclusions of Western 
science as well as to the forced and often disastrous application of proletarian 
science’s ‘discoveries’ to Soviet industry and agriculture.[5] 
When the “Thesis of the Unity of International Sciences” was still in place, the PCF 
was quite happy to have sympathetic philosophers like Lefebvre developing their own 
variants of Marxist philosophy. Besides echoing the spirit of unity and liberalization 
that the Communist Party wished to foster while participating in the post-war 
government, this type of intellectual work added to the Party's prestige. During this 
ephemeral moment, Lefebvre was even explicitly recognized by the Party as 
representing, "le marxisme vivant."[6] Given this policy and this approbation, it is 
understandable how a Party that immediately before the war had banned and 
destroyed his work for being too Hegelian would, in 1946, offer to publish a proposed 
eight-volume tome À la lumière du matérialisme dialectique.[7] According to 
Lefebvre’s outline for the opus, this massive undertaking was to develop Marxist 
thought from its logical principles through to its applications in science, politics, 
history, psychology, ethics, and esthetics.[8] 
The first volume in the series, Logique Formelle, Logique Dialectique, was published 
near the end of 1947. According to Lefebvre’s biographer, it was initially well 
received.[9] However, after the declaration by the Soviet dominated Cominform of 
the Two Sciences position, the book was attacked in Party organs for its claim that 
“the dialectic does not abolish [formal] logic.”[10] Despite Lefebvre’s explanation 
that formal logic represents only one stage in thought’s coming to know itself and his 
avowal that dialectical logic supersedes it, the fact that he gave formal logic any 
credence showed him to be “lacking party spirit” and to be petty bourgeois as 
well.[11] As the Party pointed out to him, what with its principles of identity and of 
non-contradiction, formal logic was obviously a bourgeois fantasy and was 
bivouacked in the wrong camp. So then, to give any credence to formal logic’s ability 
to help us know the world or to establish truth claims was anathema.[12] 
By the time Lefebvre received this criticism, the second volume of À la lumière du 
matérialisme dialectique on the methodology of the sciences had already gone to 
press.[13] However, after a meeting with a high ranking member of the PCF’s 
Politburo, during which Lefebvre recounts that he was upbraided for not recognizing 
that—with the triumph of the proletariat—a new logic existed, Lefebvre withdrew the 
text from publication. Predicated as it was upon the assumption that the 
methodologies of the natural and human sciences relied upon formal logic to make 
inductive and deductive hypotheses about the natural world, he did not feel that its 
claims were reconcilable with the Party’s insistence that only dialectical logic could 
make sense of the world.[14] 
Because Lefebvre withdrew Méthodologie des Sciences from the Party presses and 
because his autobiography recounts that he did so when he could see no way to 
reconcile his understanding of scientific method and of scientific knowledge with that 
of the Party, it is tempting to read this work as generally consistent with Lefebvre’s 
unique brand of Hegelian Marxism and as not in any way influenced by Soviet 
Marxism . However, given the probable period of its gestation (1939-1947) and given 
that, during much of this time, the Party was consistent in its endorsement of the Short 
Course, there is reason to suspect that this is indeed his response to Stalin’s theses in 
“Dialectical and Historical Materialism.”[15] That Lefebvre was exquisitely cognizant 
of the Short Course and of the Party’s endorsement of its ideas and that the themes 
and issues explored in Lefebvre’s text seem to echo those of the chapter on 
“Dialectical and Historical Materialism” would also lend credence to the assertion that 
the criticism of Stalin’s conclusions and the development of an alternative to them 
was at least partially Lefebvre’s intent in writing the text.[16] 
Of course, given that he was a Party member and firmly committed to communism, 
the criticisms that Lefebvre delivers of the Short Course in Méthodologie des 
Sciences are neither explicit nor direct. In fact, he never references Stalin’s text at 
all.[17] Instead of attacking it frontally (as he would in a preface to the 1969 re-
edition of Logique formelle, logique dialectique), Lefebvre describes his objective in 
the book to be a correction and critique of the two then dominant philosophies of 
science promulgated by academic philosophers.[18] Consequently, he proposes the 
dialectical materialist philosophy detailed in Méthodologie des Sciences in 
contradistinction to and as a compromise between “neo-dialectical” and “logical 
empiricist” theories of scientific knowledge.[19] As he argues, insofar as “neo-
dialecticians” like Gaston Bachelard and Ferdinand Gonseth maintain that scientific 
concepts produce scientific objects and that these concepts (and objects) change over 
time purely by force of thought, they are guilty of being excessively conventionalist 
and insufficiently materialist.[20] At the other end of the spectrum, Lefebvre criticizes 
logical empiricists like A.J. Ayer and Rudolf Carnap, not for being too materialistic, 
but for being naively materialist.[21] To him, a philosophy of science predicated on 
the assumption that logic is historically and culturally neutral and that there is a 
simple correspondence between linguistic signs and natural facts “neglects the 
historical connection between the real, knowledge, and the living individual.”[22] 
Lefebvre positions his own dialectical materialist theory of the production of scientific 
knowledge somewhere between that of the neo-dialectician and that of the neo-
positivist. With the positivists, he argues that material things exist, that scientists work 
to describe them in their objectivity, and that logic helps them to do so.[23] However, 
Lefebvre is also aware that a scientist’s social and historical position influences the 
questions she asks about the natural and social world, the way that she approaches her 
research, and the way in which the results of this research are interpreted. This bare-
bones description of Lefebvre’s theory of the conditions of the production of scientific 
knowledge neither explains how he thinks objective knowledge of the real world is 
produced nor does it distinguish Lefebvre’s theory from that of Stalin. However, as it 
is developed over the course of Méthodologie des Sciences, its innovative take on the 
relationship between dialectical and historical materialism becomes clear. 
Both Stalin and Lefebvre argue that the world (natural and social) develops 
dialectically and that it is known fully only through dialectical thought. However, it is 
not apparent to Lefebvre that only proletarians or the Communist Party can possess or 
advance this knowledge. Rather, inasmuch as scientists are engaged in an 
investigation of the material real, he argues that they are in the process of discovering 
objective truths about it. Morally, logically, and observationally rigorous, scientists 
describe the world as best they can and they tend to describe it correctly.[24] Despite 
this recognition of the scientist’s prerogative and achievement, the level of social, 
economic, and technological development of the culture in which a scientist finds 
herself practicing determines the level of objectivity and truth that she is able to 
reach.[25] Especially in the social sciences, but also in the natural sciences and 
mathematics, Lefebvre argues that scientists “present theses that constitute defenses 
(more or less well disguised) of their interests or of the interests of the limited social 
group of which they are a part.”[26] How then could such theses be considered 
objective knowledge? Well, looked at individually and synchronically, they are not. 
However, as scientists critique one another and as the culture and the economy in 
which they do their work develops, untrue and subjective theses are progressively 
overturned and replaced by truer and more objective theories.[27] 
Following Stalin, Lefebvre does suggest that some social groups (and therefore the 
scientists that come from these groups) achieve a higher degree of objectivity due to 
the social formation that produces them. The lesson that Lefebvre draws from this is 
not, however, that one social group, the working class or its representatives, finds and 
possesses objective knowledge while other groups merely reproduce prejudice. 
Rather, he contends, the recognition that social prejudices influence and distort 
scientific theses demands that every thesis be examined for its ideological biases and 
that every scientific discipline self-consciously reflect back on the conditions of its 
own production. So that this self-critique might be performed simultaneous to 
scientific research, Lefebvre argues that philosophers specializing in materialist 
dialectics be assigned to units of scientists; that way, the prejudicial assumptions 
undergirding the scientists’ hypothesis and leading to a lack of objectivity might be 
pointed out and avoided.[28] 
Despite Lefebvre’s call for dialectical materialist philosophers to police scientists, he 
does have a fairly robust and sophisticated sense of scientific practice as well as a 
respect for the work that scientists perform. This sense and this respect stand in stark 
contrast to the way in which the PCF treated actual scientists like Marcel Prenant and 
Jacques Monod at the time.[29] Given his Hegelian orientation, it is no surprise that 
Lefebvre sees the activity of scientists as basically a dialectical one. In the course of 
their activity, scientists propose theories about the way in which the world works. 
With their research, they then “demand” or force the world to try to prove that this 
theory is an illusion by encouraging it to produce facts that challenge the theory’s 
veracity. If such concrete facts emerge, the first tendency of the scientist is to 
incorporate these facts into the existing theory by inventing a corollary or sub-theory 
that explains them. However, if the facts cannot be so incorporated, then this forces a 
complete theoretical re-working; the original theory is abandoned and a new one that 
can account for the facts is introduced.[30] According to Lefebvre the history of 
science is the history of this dialectical movement from the abstract to the concrete 
repeated ad infinitum and its result is the progressive amelioration of knowledge.[31] 
This improvement is not, however, just an evolution in thought as the “neo-
dialecticians” would claim. Rather, in the process of interacting with the material real, 
scientists come to know the real objectively, that is, in its actual dialectical 
development as a series of contradictions.[32] 
In this claim and in his description of scientific practice, Lefebvre seconds the Party’s 
metaphysical stance that nature itself is dialectical. However, he does so in such a way 
that it is impossible to maintain that only the proletariat can have knowledge of this 
truth. In his account, knowledge of this truth is obtained retrospectively by the 
methods of Historical Materialism and is accessible to any and all who would inquire 
into the history of political economy.[33] With these universalist conclusions, it is no 
wonder that Party officials balked at publishing Méthodologie des Sciences at a time 
when they were calling for orthodoxy among Party members and when this orthodoxy 
included an endorsement of the two sciences position. 
After withdrawing Méthodologies des Sciences from publication, Lefebvre never 
again attempted such a critique. In fact, soon after abandoning the text and the eight-
volume project, he published a self-critical essay to atone for the sins he had 
committed against Marxism-Leninism in his work on logic and the dialectic.[34] 
However, this imposed exercise did not alter his consistent positions. Though for a 
time he curtailed his more heterodox statements on Marxist philosophy and retreated 
to literary analysis, Lefebvre never gave up the argument that Marxism was a 
philosophy of human liberation and that this liberation could be accomplished by 
scientific, cultural, and artistic means. 
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